

"must" and "should"

IETF Security Area (1)

🖉 Area Directors: Russell Housley, Sam Hartman

- btns Better-Than-Nothing Security
- dkim Domain Keys Identified Mail
- emu EAP Method Update
- hokey Handover Keying
- idwg Intrusion Detection Exchange Format
- inch Extended Incident Handling
- isms Integrated Security Model for SNMP
- keyprov Provisioning of Symmetric Keys
- kink Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
- kitten (GSS-API Next Generation)
- · krb-wg Kerberos
- Itans Long-Term Archive and Notary Services

IETF Security Area (2)

🧐 Area Directors: Russell Housley, Sam Hartman


- mobie IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming
- msec Multicast Security
- nea Network Endpoint Assessment
- openpgp An Open Specification for Pretty Good Privacy
- pki4ipsec Profiling Use of PKI in IPSEC
- pkix Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
- sasl Simple Authentication and Security Layer
- secsh Secure Shell
- smime S/MIME Mail Security
- syslog Security Issues in Network Event Logging
- Tls Transport Layer Security

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
Communications insecurity


- architectural errors
 - wrong trust assumptions
- default = no security
- protocol errors
 - unilateral entity authentication
 - weak entity authentication mechanism
 - downgrade attack
- modes of operation errors


 no authenticated encryption
 wrong use of crypto
- range of wireless communication is often underestimated!
- cryptographic errors
 weak crypto
- implementation errors
- timated!





A state	A historical perspective (2)					
1980	mobile phones	1990	2000			
AM	PS analog cloning, scanners	GSM/TDMA TDMA cloning	attacks on A5, COMP128		GSM	
	W	'LAN —	1997 WEP WEP broker		2004 WPA2 802.11i PA	
		PAN ·	1999 Bluetooth	-	2004 14 ooth problems	


























26

SSL / TLS • Mainly in context of WWW security, i.e., to secure the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) • But, in between application layer and TCP,

thus can be used to secure other applications than HTTP too (IMAP, telnet, ftp, ...)

Other WWW security protocols


- PCT: Microsoft's alternative to SSL
- S-HTTP: S/MIME-like protocol
- · SET: for credit card transactions
- XML-Signature: PKCS#7-based signature on XML documents
- ...


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
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
SSL / TLS • "Secure Sockets Layer" (Netscape) - SSL 2.0: security flaws! - SSL 3.0: still widely used - not interoperable with TLS 1.0 • "Transport Layer Security" (IETF) - TLS 1.0: adopted SSL 3.0 with minor changes - RFC 2246, 01/99 (PS) • TLS: security at the transport layer - can be used (and is intended) for other applications too - end-to-end secure channel, but nothing more ...


- data is only protected during communication – no non-repudiation!












A STREET	RFC 3268: AES Ciphersuites for TLS 06/2002							
	CipherSuite	Key Exchange	Certificate Type					
	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	RSA	RSA					
	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH_DSS	DSS					
	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH_RSA	RSA					
	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE_DSS	DSS					
	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE_RSA	RSA					
	TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH_anon						
	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	RSA	RSA					
	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH_DSS	DSS					
	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH_RSA	RSA					
	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE_DSS	DSS					
	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE_RSA	RSA					
	TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH_anon						





- upgrade to TLS within HTTP/1.1 (RFC 2817, 05/00)
- HTTP over TLS (RFC 2818, May 2000)
- Addition of ciphers:
 - Kerberos cipher suites (RFC 2712, 10/99; 11/00)
 - ECC cipher suites (03/01)
 - AES (01/01)
 - misc. ciphers: MISTY1 (03/01), Camellia (10/00)
 - extensions for OpenPGP keys (03/01)
- Other:
 - wireless extensions (11/00)
 - TLS Delegation (02/01)
 - SRP for TLS authentication (02/01)

TLS in the future (1) • TLS 2.0 ? • Some possible TLS enhancements, discussed within the IETF TLS WG: - RSA-OAEP - identity protection [note that this is already indirectly possible by authenticating within a DH_anon session]

- cipher suites for compression

35

- missing cipher suites (not all combinations possible)
- · Backward compatibility remains very important!

38

TLS in the future (2)

TLS 1.1 – RFC June 2005


- security fixes and clarifications
- SSL/TLS is still in evolution !


Enhancements currently considered within IETF

- new cipher suites: e.g., AES, ECC
 wireless support (see WAP-WTLS) and other extensions
- password-based authentication and key exchange (SRP)


Other enhancements proposed in literature

- performance improvements: 'batching' [ShachamBoneh'01] and 'fast-track' [ShachamBoneh'02]
- user (identity) privacy [PersianoVisconti'00]
- client puzzles ^[DeanStubblefield'01] to counter denial-of-service attacks
- trust negotiation ^[Hess et al'02]





plenty of known plaintext (both SSL/TLS and HTTP related)



Security in transport layer

- Transparent for application
- Pro: can be used for all TCP-based applications, without modifying them
- Con: authentication is one, but who/what to trust, is important
- Non-repudiation?


• In practice: (partially) integrated in application


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
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
Non-repudiation


- Legally only if in application, thus not provided by SSL/TLS
- SSL/TLS secures the communication channel, but not the exchanged messages
- SSL/TLS does not use digital signatures in the first place (except for client authentication)
- For electronic business, more advanced security protocols are needed...












- Rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity)
- Confidentiality
- Limited traffic flow confidentiality

47





IPsec - Concepts


- Security features are added as extension headers that follow the main IP header
 - Authentication header (AH)
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header
- Security Association (SA)
 - Security Parameter Index (SPI)
 - IP destination address
 - Security Protocol Identifier (AH or ESP)




IKE Algorithm Selection Mandatory Algorithms Algorithm Type IKE v1 IKE v2 **Payload Encryption** DES-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC-MD5 HMAC-SHA1 Payload Integrity HMAC-SHA1 DH Group 1536 Bit 768 Bit Transfer Type 1 ENCR DES CBC ENCR AES 128 CBC (Encryption) Transfer Type 2 PRF_HMAC_SHA1 PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (PRF) [RFC2104] [RFC2104] Transfer Type 3 AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 [RFC2404] (Integrity) [RFC2404] Source: draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-algorithms-00.txt, May 2003










	IPsec - ESP Transport mode									
[IP hdr	upper layer data								
[IP hdr	ESP hdr	upper layer data	ESP tlr	ICV					
		Confidentiality								
		Integrity								
					55					










- IKE Main Mode with Digital Signatures
 - mutual entity authentication
- mutual implicit and explicit key authentication
- mutual key confirmation
- joint key control
- · identity protection
- · freshness of keying material
- perfect forward secrecy of keying material
- non-repudiation of communication
- cryptographic algorithm negotiation



IKE v2 Initial Handshake (1/2) Alice and Bob negotiate cryptographic algorithms, mutually authenticate, and establish a session key, creating an IKE-SA Usually consists of two request/response pairs The first pair negotiates cryptographic

- algorithms and does a Diffie-Hellman exchange
- The second pair is encrypted and integrity protected with keys based on the Diffie-Hellman exchange

IKE v2 Initial Handshake (2/2)

Second exchange

- divulge identities
- prove identities using an integrity check based on the secret associated with their identity (private key or shared secret key) and the contents of the first pair of messages in the exchange
- establish a first IPsec SA ("child-SA") is during the initial IKE-SA creation

64

66

IPsec Overview

- Much better than previous alternatives
- · IPsec documents hard to read

- Committee design: too complex
 - ESP in Tunnel mode probably sufficient
 - Simplify key management
 - Clarify cryptographic requirements
- ...and thus difficult to implement (securely)


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
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
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
VPN?


- <u>V</u>irtual <u>P</u>rivate <u>N</u>etwork
- Connects a private network over a public network.
- Connection is secured by tunneling protocols.
- The nature of the public network is irrelevant to the user.
- It appears as if the data is being sent over the private network.























- SSH, PGP: stand-alone applications, immediately and easy to deploy and use
- Network security: solved in principle
- Electronic commerce security: more is needed!

75



- William Stallings, *Cryptography and Network Security - Principles and Practice*, Fourth Edition, 2006
- Nagand Doraswamy, Dan Harkins, IPSEC -*The New Security Standard for the Internet, Intranets, and Virtual Private Networks*, Prentice Hall, 1999.

More information (2)

• Java Security (2nd edition) http://www.securingjava.com/

- W3C Security (incl WWW Security FAQ) http://www.w3.org/Security/
- "E-Commerce Security, Weak Links, Best Defenses"

http://www.cigital.com/books/ecs/

 "Security Technologies for the World Wide Web" http://www.esecurity.ch/Books/wwwsec.html